On this page
Why 'Stablecoin' Is Not One Thing
The word stablecoin implies a single type of instrument, but the category encompasses at least three structurally distinct designs that fail for completely different reasons. Treating them as interchangeable (as many casual users do) means carrying risks you do not understand and cannot manage.
The shared promise is a price peg, typically to the US dollar. The mechanism by which that peg is maintained is where the designs diverge, and the mechanism is everything. A peg maintained by actual dollar reserves in a bank account is vulnerable to banking runs and reserve opacity. A peg maintained by over-collateralised crypto assets is vulnerable to collateral price crashes. A peg maintained by an algorithmic relationship between two tokens is vulnerable to confidence spirals that can collapse it to zero in hours. Each design has demonstrated its specific failure mode under real market conditions.
Design 1: Fiat-Backed (USDT, USDC) — Counterparty and Reserve Risk
Fiat-backed stablecoins work by a simple mechanism: the issuer holds dollars (or dollar-equivalent assets) in custody, and each token in circulation is theoretically redeemable for one dollar. Tether (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC) are the two dominant examples.
The stability of this design depends entirely on two things: the accuracy of the reserve claim and the operational integrity of the issuer. Tether's reserve composition has been a persistent source of controversy: at various points its reserves included commercial paper, secured loans, and other instruments that are not dollar-equivalents in a stress scenario. Tether has settled regulatory actions related to reserve misrepresentation without admitting or denying the findings. Its peg has historically held, but the argument for why it will continue holding involves trusting the issuer more than the audit trail fully supports.
USDC's March 2023 depeg event illustrates a different version of this risk. When Silicon Valley Bank (which held a portion of Circle's USDC reserves) failed and was placed in FDIC receivership, USDC temporarily traded as low as 87 cents before the FDIC backstop restored confidence in the reserves. The peg broke not because Circle had done anything wrong, but because one of its banking counterparties failed. Counterparty risk in the traditional financial system became stablecoin risk in the crypto ecosystem.
Design 2: Crypto-Collateralized (DAI) — Liquidation Cascades and Collateral Risk
DAI, created by MakerDAO, maintains its dollar peg not through fiat reserves but through over-collateralisation in cryptocurrency. Users deposit ETH or other approved assets into Maker's smart contracts and draw DAI against them at a collateral ratio well above 100 percent (often 150 percent or higher). If the collateral value falls below the required ratio, the position is automatically liquidated.
This design does not require trusting a centralised issuer, which is its primary advantage. Its vulnerability is structural: when the assets used as collateral (predominantly ETH) fall sharply in price, the system triggers mass liquidations simultaneously. Those liquidations sell collateral into a falling market, which can depress prices further, triggering more liquidations. This cascade dynamic reached serious stress levels during the March 2020 market crash, when ETH dropped roughly 50 percent in hours and the Maker protocol briefly fell into bad debt before emergency measures were applied.
DAI has survived multiple market cycles and remains one of the most battle-tested DeFi primitives. Understanding that its stability comes with collateral-cascade exposure (rather than reserve opacity) helps users choose the right context for holding it.
Design 3: Algorithmic — The TerraUSD May 2022 Death Spiral Explained
Algorithmic stablecoins attempt to maintain a dollar peg through a market incentive mechanism rather than through reserves or collateral. TerraUSD (UST) was the most prominent example and its collapse in May 2022 remains the defining case study in this design category's failure mode.
UST maintained its peg through an arbitrage relationship with LUNA, the native token of the Terra blockchain. When UST traded above a dollar, holders could burn LUNA to mint new UST and pocket the difference, increasing supply and pushing the price back down. When UST traded below a dollar, holders could burn UST to mint LUNA and profit from the gap, reducing supply and pushing the price back up. The mechanism worked as long as there was confidence in it.
The collapse began when large holders began selling UST from the Anchor protocol, a lending platform that had been offering 20 percent APY on UST deposits, a yield rate that was economically unsustainable. As UST began to depeg slightly, confidence in the peg began to erode. Holders who had been counting on the peg began exiting, selling UST accelerated the depeg, and the LUNA minting mechanism kicked in to restore it. But each round of LUNA minting increased LUNA supply and diluted its price. As LUNA's price fell, the algorithmic mechanism that was supposed to restore the peg actually accelerated the confidence spiral. Within days, LUNA's market capitalisation had collapsed by over 99 percent and UST was trading at a fraction of a cent. An estimated 40 billion dollars in value was destroyed.
The deep-dive into historical stablecoin depegging events analyses the TerraUSD collapse alongside other significant depeg events with the technical detail necessary to understand what specifically failed at each stage.
How to Read Attestation Reports vs Full Reserve Audits
Users of fiat-backed stablecoins are regularly pointed to "attestation reports" as evidence of reserve adequacy. An attestation is not an audit. An attestation is a document in which an accounting firm confirms that reserve balances matched token supply at a specific point in time. It says nothing about the quality, liquidity, or counterparty risk of those reserves, and it does not involve the sustained scrutiny of a full financial audit.
A full reserve audit examines not just the balance at a moment in time but the composition, the custody arrangements, the counterparty exposures, and the procedures for maintaining reserves under stress. Very few stablecoin issuers have published full audits in this sense. Understanding this distinction is necessary for evaluating any reserve claim honestly.
A Risk Framework for Choosing Which Stablecoin to Hold
The right framework maps stablecoin type to use case and time horizon. Fiat-backed stablecoins are appropriate for short-term storage and transfers where you need liquidity and broad exchange support — but you are accepting counterparty and reserve risk in exchange for that convenience. Crypto-collateralized stablecoins like DAI are appropriate for users who want to avoid centralised counterparty risk and are comfortable with the liquidation-cascade exposure during volatile periods. Algorithmic stablecoins with no reserve backing have no appropriate use case for value storage given their demonstrated failure mode.
No stablecoin eliminates risk. The design determines which specific type of risk you are carrying, and that risk should be a conscious choice rather than an assumption.





